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Businesses and individuals, in an economy like that of the United States,
can finance their activities in a rich variety of ways. Businesses investing
in new plant and equipment can rely on internally generated funds, or
they can raise external funds from the financial markets. When they do
turn to external sources of funds, they can issue either debt obligations or
new equity shares in the enterprise. Individuals can likewise use their
own or borrowed funds to make major purchases like automobiles, and
many individuals can also borrow to finance ordinary consumer spending
as well as major hard goods. Even in arranging home purchases, transac-
tions that are almost always partly debt financed, individuals usually can
choose what fraction of the purchase price initially represents their own
equity. In principle, businesses and individuals are continually making
these and other financing choices on the basis of yield comparisons, credit
availability, and other considerations, so that the total amount of debt
financing does not necessarily have to bear any close relationship to the
underlying economic activity.
In fact, however, the relationship between outstanding debt and eco-
nomic activity in the United States is remarkably steady—indeed, just as
steady as the more widely recognized and better understood relationship
between economic activity and money. The aggregate outstanding in-
debtedness of all nonfinancial borrowers in the United States has been
approximately $1.40 for each $1.00 of the economy's gross national
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product, ever since World War II. Throughout the postwar period the
overall debt-to-income ratio has displayed neither trend nor cyclical
variation.
Moreover, the stability of the U.S. economy's outstanding debt in
relation to its income has not merely represented the stability of a sum of
stable parts, as is apparently the case (apart from trend) among the
familiar monetary aggregates. Neither private sector debt nor govern-
ment debt has borne a stable relationship to economic activity, but their
total has. In particular, the secular rise and procyclical fluctuation in the
private sector's debt have approximately offset the corresponding secular
decline (relative to income) and countercyclical fluctuation in the federal
government's debt.
The stability of the debt-to-income relationship, if it is indeed a reg-
ularity that will persist, bears a number of important implications for the
U.S. economy. The finding that debt is as reliably related to economic
activity as is money has immediate implications for the choice of mone-
tary policy target. It is also potentially relevant for fiscal policy, in that
some hypotheses that may explain the observed debt-to-income stability
bear strong implications for the "crowding out" of private investment by
debt-financed government spending. Finally, it is especially important in
the context of the current widespread concern over capital formation in
the U.S. economy. The financing of an increased capital formation rate in
the 1980s, as well as the aggregate-level risk to the economy associated
with that financing, depends in large part on issues underlying the debt-
to-income relationship.
The object of this chapter is to examine the debt-to-income stability
phenomenon in the United States, with particular attention to implica-
tions for the financing of capital formation. Section 6.1 explains in what
sense the economy's outstanding debt is stable in relation to its income.
Section 6.2 reports on some empirical comparisons of relative stability for
different liability and asset aggregates. Section 6.3 outlines three separate
hypotheses that could plausibly account for the observed debt-to-income
stability, emphasizing the economic implications of these hypotheses,
and briefly reports on some preliminary attempts to test them empiri-
cally. To anticipate, findings thus far along these lines are largely incon-
clusive, so that the debt-to-income stability phenomenon itself, while
well documented, remains something of a puzzle. Section 6.4 concludes
the chapter by briefly considering some implications of debt-to-income
stability for the financing of U.S. capital formation.
6.1 Debt and Income in the Postwar Period
Table 6.1 presents data showing the year-end indebtedness of U.S
nonfinancial borrowers, as a percentage of fourth-quarter gross national93 Debt and Economic Activity
product, for each year since 1945. The first column of the table shows the
total credit market indebtedness of all U.S. nonfinancial borrowers. The
next five columns present comparable data dividing this total into the
respective indebtedness of each of five specific borrowing sectors. The
table's final column shows, as a memorandum item, comparable data (not
included in the total in the first column) for the debt issued in U.S.
markets by foreign borrowers.
1 Figure 6.1 plots the total nonfinancial
debt ratio and its five components by sector.
These data are "net" in the sense that they net out financial intermedia-
tion. In other words, the data include such items as a household's mort-
gage issued to a bank, or a corporation's bonds sold to an insurance
company, but they exclude any liability issued in turn by the bank or the
insurance company in order to finance that lending activity. The data also
exclude debt issued by separate financial subsidiaries of nonfinancial
corporations, as well as by federally sponsored credit agencies and mort-
gage pools. The data are "gross," however, in the sense that they include
all of an individual household or firm's outstanding credit market liabili-
ties, not just any excess of liabilities over either financial or total assets,
and also in the sense that they include one household's borrowing from
another or one firm's borrowing from another.
The strong stability of the total nonfinancial debt ratio, shown in the
top line in Figure 6.1 and the first column of Table 6.1, stands out in stark
contrast to the variation of the individual sector components. The non-
financial economy's reliance on debt, scaled in relation to economic
activity, has shown almost no trend and but little variation since World
War II. During this period the total nonfinancial debt ratio has trended
slightly upward, apart from a dip in the first few postwar years, and has
also exhibited a slight cyclically, typically rising a point or two in reces-
sion years (when gross national product, in the denominator, is weak).
The individual components of this total, however, have varied in
sharply different directions both secularly and cyclically. In brief, the
secular postwar rise in private debt has largely mirrored a substantial
decline (relative to economic activity) in federal government debt, while
cyclical bulges in federal debt issuance have mostly had their counterpart
in the abatement of private borrowing. Households have almost con-
tinuously increased their reliance on debt in relation to their nonfinancial
activity throughout this period. Both corporations and unincorporated
businesses have also issued steadily more debt, on a relative basis, except
for temporary retrenchments during recession years. State and local
governments steadily increased their relative debt-issuing activity during
the 1950s and '60s, but just as steadily reduced it during the 1970s. Except
only for 1975-76 and 1980, the federal government has reduced its debt
1. In part because of the capital export controls that were in force during 1964-74, foreign
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Fig. 6.1 Outstanding Debt of U.S. Nonfinancial Borrowers, 1946-80.
ratio in every year since 1953, although this relative debt reduction has
been slower in years when recession has temporarily inflated its deficit
(and, again, depressed gross national product in the denominator).
Although the principal focus of this chapter is on the postwar experi-
ence shown in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1, it is also useful to consider briefly
the history of the economy's debt ratio in a longer time frame. Figure 6.2
shows the size and composition of the U.S. nonfinancial debt ratio (with
corporations and unincorporated businesses aggregated) for 1918-78.
Apart from a one-time adjustment associated with the fall of prices after
World War I, the U.S. nonfinancial economy's reliance on debt relative
to economic activity showed essentially no trend over these sixty years.
1970 1979
Fig. 6.2 Outstanding Debt of U.S. Nonfinancial Borrowers, 1918-78.
From Friedman (1980).97 Debt and Economic Activity
At 143 percent as of year-end 1978, the debt ratio was virtually un-
changed from 142 percent in 1921. Nonfinancial borrowers' outstanding
debt rose significantly in relation to gross national product only during
the Depression years 1930-33, when gross national product itself not only
was well below trend but also was falling too rapidly for the pay-down of
debt to keep pace.
2 Otherwise the economy's total nonfinancial debt ratio
remained roughly steady throughout this period, and the postwar stabil-
ity therefore appears to be in large part a continuation of a pattern that
dates back at least to the 1920s.
6.2 Comparative Stability Analysis
In order to determine that a relationship is stable, it is important to
have at hand some benchmark for comparative purposes. In other words,
if the debt-to-income relationship is to be judged "stable," then stable in
comparison with what? Table 6.2 indicates five liability aggregates (in-
cluding total nonfinancial debt, as shown in ratio form in Table 6.1 and
Figure 6.1) and five asset aggregates used for such comparative purposes
in a series of tests of the stability of each of these aggregates in relation to
U.S. economic activity during 1953-78.
3 In brief, the results of these tests,
drawn from Friedman 1981, are as follows:
Comparison of Ratios. Table 6.1 shows the ratio of the U.S. economy's
total nonfinancial debt to gross national product. One form of relative
stability test is simply to compare the variability of this ratio over time, as
measured by its coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the
mean), with that of analogous ratios for other liability or asset aggre-
gates. As the first and third columns of Table 6.3 show, this comparison
for data including time trends indicates that total net assets and total
nonfinancial debt are (in that order) the most stable, while the Ml money
stock and the monetary base (in that order) are the least stable, among
the ten aggregates. The corresponding comparison for detrended data,
shown in the adjacent columns of Table 6.3, again indicates that total net
assets is the most stable aggregate in relation to gross national product,
with total debt and total nonfinancial debt, respectively, a close second
and third. The monetary base exhibits the least stability on a detrended
basis, with private nonfinancial liabilities and the Ml money stock close
behind. Orderings based on annual data are essentially the same as those
based on quarterly data.
2. The debt ratio peak during 1918-78 occurred in 1933, the trough year of the Depres-
sion. In addition, much of the household and business debt nominally outstanding during
the Depression was of questionable value.
3. It is important to exclude the earlier data because of the behavior of the monetary
aggregates while the Federal Reserve System stabilized government bond prices before the
Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord.<1) M (1
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Nominal Income Regressions. Simple ratios of precisely contempo-
raneous observations may well fail to capture the relevant concept of
"stability" in the relationship among variables that move over time with
some general lead or lag pattern between them. A second relative stabil-
ity test therefore involves estimating ten regression equations, in each
case relating the growth of nominal gross national product to a moving
average of the growth of one of the ten financial aggregates listed in Table
6.2, plus a moving average of a fiscal policy measure, along the lines made
familiar by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. As the fifth column of
Table 6.3 shows, total net assets performs best in this test based on
quarterly data for 1953-78, with a standard error of 0.85 percent per
quarter in "explaining" the historical growth of gross national product,
while bank credit (standard error 0.97 percent) performs worst.
4 Total
nonfinancial debt is about in the middle. Because the evidence indicates
at least some significant break in each of the underlying regressions at
around 1970, the last column of Table 6.3 also shows the respective
standard errors for analogous regression equations based on data for
1970-78 only. For this shorter period the relative performance of total
nonfinancial debt is somewhat better, equaling that of the Ml money
stock.
Richer Dynamic Representations. In part because of the extent to which
regressions of the St. Louis form have been discredited by a variety of
criticisms, researchers examining the money-to-income (or, here, debt-
to-income) relationship have increasingly turned to methods that allow
for a richer dynamic interaction between money and income by relating
the variation of income not to the entirety of the variation of money but
only to that part of it which cannot already be deduced either from the
past history of money itself or from the joint past history of both money
and income.
5 In this context a key indication of the stability of the
relationship to income of any financial aggregate is the behavior of that
relationship following just such an "innovation," or unanticipated move-
ment, in the aggregate. The aggregate-to-income ratio, of course, rises at
first after a positive innovation, but it will then fall back toward a normal
position if the rise in the aggregate induces a subsequent rise in income
(or a reversal in the aggregate itself). Both the timing and the magnitude
of the ratio's return to normal provide important information about the
stability of the dynamic aggregate-to-income relationship.
4. An equation with standard error of 0.85 percent would be expected to predict the GNP
growth rate to within ±0.85 percent two-thirds of the time. This ranking ignores the
superior result for M3 based on a shorter sample period.
5. Among the most important criticisms of the St. Louis approach have been those of
Goldfeld and Blinder (1972), Sargent (1976), and Modigliani and Ando (1976). The
methodology underlying the tests described below is due largely to Granger and Sims; see
especially Sims (1980).101 Debt and Economic Activity
Experimentation along these lines indicates that, on the whole, there is
little ground for distinguishing the stability of any one of the five asset
aggregates listed in Table 6.2 from that of any other. The same is not true
for the five liability aggregates, however. Here only the total nonfinancial
debt ratio (again, the series shown in Table 6.1), and to a lesser extent the
bank credit ratio, return to their initial values rapidly and without over-
shooting after a shock to the relevant aggregate. What is especially
interesting in these results is the contrast between the performance of the
ratio for total nonfinancial debt and the ratios for nonfederal debt and
private debt (both of which are just components of the total) as well as the
broader total debt measure. Both the private debt ratio and the nonfed-
eral debt ratio continue to move farther away from their initial values for
two years in response to an innovation in the relevant aggregate, and
neither shows any significant return to its initial value within five years—
hardly a demonstration of stability. Once federal government debt is
included, however, the total nonfinancial debt ratio exhibits just as much
stability in this context as does any of the five asset ratios. Moreover,
proceeding to broaden the liability aggregate further by including finan-
cial intermediaries' credit market liabilities results only in lessened appar-
ent stability.
Among the various liability measures considered, therefore, these
results suggest that there is indeed something unique about total non-
financial debt. It is as if the Ml money stock ratio were sharply unstable,
but adding commercial bank time and saving deposits to form the M2
money stock ratio yielded stability, and further adding thrift institution
deposits to form the M3 money stock ratio destroyed that stability—none
of which appears to happen. Hence not only does the total nonfinancial
debt ratio exhibit just as much stability as any of the five asset ratios in
these dynamic tests, but it does so uniquely among the various liability
aggregates tested.
6
Overview. In sum, the evidence provided by these three different kinds
of tests shows that at least one aggregate measure of outstanding debt
liabilities—total nonfinancial debt—consistently exhibits just as much
stability in relation to economic activity as do the more familiar asset
aggregates including the money stock (however measured). Indeed,
some of these tests suggest that the debt-to-income relationship, mea-
sured in this way, is more stable than any of the various money-to-income
relationships. Regardless of whether the U.S. debt-to-income rela-
tionship is "as stable as" or "more stable than" that for money, however,
like the money-to-income relationship it is potentially important for
understanding the economy. By contrast, although the money-to-income
6. Similar tests that distinguish between effects on real income and effects on prices in the
reaction of nominal income (not described in the text) show essentially identical results.102 Benjamin M. Friedman
relationship has long been the focus of attention, the debt-to-income
relationship has to date received little notice.
6.3 Three Possible Explanations
What accounts for this stability? Well-accepted models of the role of
money in the economic process suggest a close relationship to income on
a priori grounds, but what little study the role of debt has received in the
literature thus far has not appeared to indicate any necessarily close or
stable relationship to income. Explaining the observed stability of the
debt-to-income relationship therefore presents a major research chal-
lenge.
A useful starting place for thinking about the underlying economic
behavior that could plausibly explain the observed stability of the rela-
tionship between the nonfinancial economy's total liabilities and its in-
come is the familiar proposition that, because people hold wealth for the
stream of services (positive for assets, negative for liabilities) it provides,
they therefore maintain some approximately fixed target for overall
wealth in relation to their incomes. Each person's wealth-to-income
target is age specific, of course, but if the age structure of the population is
roughly stable over time the economy's aggregate wealth-to-income ratio
will be approximately stable as well.
7
Work to date suggests three potential explanations for a stable debt-to-
income ratio, each of which proceeds from the assumption of a stable
wealth-to-income ratio for the economy as a whole.
An Ultrarationality Hypothesis. One such potential explanation is an
"ultrarationality" hypothesis that in part recasts into stock-flow form
work by David and Scadding (1974) intended to explain the stability of
the U.S. gross private saving rate as noted earlier by Denison (1958). If
the streams of services (again, positive for assets and negative for liabili-
ties) provided by specific components of overall wealth are imperfect
substitutes for one another, then the same analysis that implies a stable
target wealth in relation to income also implies a stable "subtarget" for
each component—including indebtedness. If, in addition, individuals
"see through the shell" of government and corporations, as David and
Scadding (1974) argued, then they will regard debt obligations issued by
the government (for the case of taxpayers) and by corporations (for
shareholders) as equivalent to their own liabilities.
Under the ultrarationality hypothesis, therefore, the observed stability
of the aggregate debt-to-income relationship has primarily reflected the
response of the private sector to movements in the government's indebt-
7. Modigliani (1966) provided a clear discussion of these propositions, showing how they
are derivable from more fundamental principles.103 Debt and Economic Activity
edness. Given any variation in the government's liabilities, for whatever
purposes may be indicated by public policy, the private sector consisting
of households and the corporations that the households own will simply
adjust by issuing enough debt to offset the government's action: Yet a
further elaboration of the same basic idea that changes nothing fun-
damental is to view corporations as also responding to independent
objectives or influences (for example, tax laws), and households as then
adjusting their debt positions to offset the given actions of both the
government and the corporations. In either case, the nonfinancial econ-
omy will seek (and achieve) a stable ratio of its aggregate liabilities to
income, regardless of the composition of that aggregate.
The ultrarationality hypothesis is interesting for several reasons that go
beyond its potential ability to explain the debt-to-income stability phe-
nomenon. From a purely behavioral standpoint it carries strong implica-
tions about individuals' perceptions and about familiar aspects of wealth
holding. In addition, as David and Scadding (1974) have pointed out, it
implies that people regard as close substitutes personal saving and corpo-
rate saving, as well as personal consumption and taxes. Hence "crowding
out ex ante" renders fiscal policy impotent in both the short and the long
run.
A Capital-Leveraging Hypothesis. A second potential explanation is a
"capital-leveraging" hypothesis that emphasizes credit market imperfec-
tions and the need of most would-be borrowers to provide some kind of
collateral, explicit or implicit, in order to obtain credit. To the extent that
people do not see through the shell of government, or that the distribu-
tion of tax liabilities and the distribution of bond holdings overlap only
weakly, the private sector's assets (after netting out inside debt) consist of
tangible assets—including not only corporate assets like plant and equip-
ment but also residential real estate and consumer durables—plus gov-
ernment bonds. If people have not only a stable target for net wealth but
also a stable subtarget for total assets in relation to income, then they will
vary their holdings of tangible assets so as to offset variations in the
government's outstanding indebtedness. Variations in the private sec-
tor's holdings of tangible assets also typically affect its borrowing capac-
ity, however. When collateral constraints are binding, the increase in
tangible asset holdings that follows as a consequence of a reduction in the
government's indebtedness therefore facilitates a corresponding increase
in the private sector's outstanding liabilities.
The importance of credit market constraints is most readily apparent in
the household sector's debt arrangements. In fact, borrowing against
tangible assets in the form of home mortgage and consumer installment
credit has constituted the overwhelming majority of the household sec-
tor's credit market indebtedness at least since World War II (89 percent104 Benjamin M. Friedman
as of year-end 1980). Similarly, the borrowing of many corporations
consists primarily of explicitly secured long-term market debt, in the form
of mortgages or "first-mortgage" bonds, and implicitly secured short-
term bank debt matched by inventory holdings.
If credit market collateral constraints restrict the private sector's ability
to substitute its own liabilities in place of the government's declining
indebtedness, the private sector can increase its outstanding liabilities
only to the extent that it is also accumulating more tangible assets with
which to back them. Under the capital-leveraging hypothesis, therefore,
the stability of the U.S. nonfinancial debt ratio has reflected in the first
instance an increase in tangible assets in approximately the proportion
necessary to hold the private sector's net worth fixed in relation to
income, as its ownership of government liabilities has declined relative to
income. By easing the effective credit market constraints, this relative
increase in tangible assets facilitates the increase in private sector liabili-
ties. If private liabilities increase fully in step with tangible asset holdings,
while tangible assets increase in step with the reduction in government
debt, then total nonfinancial debt (private plus government) will remain
stable in relation to income.
The capital-leveraging hypothesis also bears a number of potentially
interesting implications apart from any connection to the stable debt-to-
income relationship. Probably the most important of these is the picture
it provides of the importance of collateral constraints in the everyday
working of the credit markets. In addition, it implies that the govern-
ment's deficit is a major determinant of the economy's physical invest-
ment. Unlike the ultrarationality hypothesis, however, it implies no
necessary connection between consumption and taxes, so that fiscal
policy can affect not just the composition of income but also its total.
An Asset Demand Hypothesis. Finally—at least with respect to work
done thus far—a third potential explanation is that the appearance of
stability in the economy's liability-issuing behavior is merely a conse-
quence of balance sheet identities and market-clearing conditions im-
posed on stable asset-holding behavior. If the separate streams of services
provided by tangible assets and financial assets are imperfect substitutes,
then people will have stable subtargets in relation to income for the two
asset classes separately. In other words, the demand for financial assets,
given income, will be relatively interest inelastic. Since total financial
assets held must equal total financial assets issued, however, the com-
bination of inelastic demand and an at least partly elastic supply will also
result in a stable relationship between income and total financial assets
issued.
8
8. At the most fully aggregated level—that is, with the government and the private sector
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Liabilities as a Percentage of Tangible Asset Holdings
The most interesting implications of the resulting "asset demand"
hypothesis concern the role of equities in asset holders' portfolios, and
the nature of financial intermediation. Because what is stable in relation
to income is outstanding debt liabilities of nonfinancial borrowers, a
stable demand for total financial assets is, in the end, not a sufficient
explanation after all. In addition, it is necessary to posit not only that
investors treat debt and equity securities as only weakly substitutable—
an assumption that in turn bears importantly on the debate about the "ex
post crowding out" of private spending by debt-financed fiscal policy—
but also that, in holding debt obligations issued by an intermediary,
investors look through the shell of the intermediary too.
9
Test Results. Efforts thus far to test these three potential explanations
for the stable debt-to-income relationship, using data for the U.S. house-
hold and nonfinancial corporate business sectors, have not produced
conclusive results.
Perhaps the strongest statement possible on the basis of these results is
that the capital-leveraging hypothesis is clearly not the entire answer. As
Figure 6.3 shows, neither individuals nor nonfinancial business corpora-
tions have on balance increased their indebtedness merely in pace with
their ownership of tangible assets. During 1947-66 for individuals, and
during 1957-73 for corporations, the rapid increase in private sector
indebtedness also represented increasing leverage.
side of the asset markets for purposes of measurement. This problem is merely an example
of the fundamental identification problem emphasized by Brainard and Tobin (1968) and
Smith (1975).
9. My earlier paper (Friedman 1978) showed why the substitutability of debt and equity
securities is so important for the "crowding out" issue.106 Benjamin M. Friedman
Tests do, however, reveal at least some positive evidence consistent
with each of the three hypotheses (see Friedman 1981). For example, the
dynamic relationship between the federal and nonfederal components of
the total nonfinancial debt-to-income ratio shows a distinct tendency for
the nonfederal debt ratio to fall in relation to a positive innovation (in the
sense described in Section 6.2) in the federal debt ratio, after a delay of
about one year. Conversely, a positive innovation in the nonfederal debt
ratio causes the federal debt ratio to fall, essentially without delay. In a
study of the three-way interaction among federal debt, corporate debt,
and corporate tangible asset holdings, a positive innovation in the federal
debt ratio immediately reduces corporate tangible assets and corporate
indebtedness relative to income, thereby lending support to the capital-
leveraging hypothesis. In an analogous study for the household sector, a
positive innovation in the federal debt ratio immediately reduces house-
hold tangible assets relative to income, but the associated reduction of
household indebtedness follows only after a puzzling delay of two years.
Overall, although (at least) three different explanations are available
for the observed stability of the debt-to-income relationship in the United
States, the evidence now at hand is insufficient to choose among them.
The debt-to-income phenomenon remains for the present a major puzzle.
In light of its potential importance, finding the right explanation is an
objective that clearly warrants further research.
6.4 Implications for Debt and Equity Financing
of Capital Formation
An increased rate of capital formation has emerged as a nearly undis-
puted objective of U.S. economic policy for the 1980s. Dissatisfaction
with the U.S. economy's poor productivity performance in the 1970s, as
well as with the erosion of international competitiveness that began much
earlier but also became more evident in the 1970s as the international
exchange value of the dollar declined dramatically, has elevated what was
once largely a business interest into a much more widely shared goal. In
today's environment, groups representing labor and consumers also rec-
ognize the need for capital investment to create jobs and to raise produc-
tivity and hence the population's overall standard of living. On the whole,
public discussion has moved from whether more capital formation is
desirable to what policies can best achieve it.
An important aspect of capital formation that this discussion has often
overlooked, however, is its explicitly financial side. In an economy like
that of the United States, each decision to create more physical capital
necessarily has a financial counterpart. Moreover, the financial transac-
tions associated with capital formation are not merely a reflection of real
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setting in which the financing of capital formation takes place can also be
a key determinant of real resource allocations, including not only the
total amount of capital formation undertaken but also its composition.
The financial and nonfinancial elements of the process jointly determine
one another, and public policy can affect the ultimate outcome by in-
fluencing either.
It is also important to recognize that businesses and individuals in the
U.S. economy have in fact been undertaking more capital formation
rather than less, at least in the usual sense of investment in plant and
equipment. As the first column of Table 6.4 shows, over the past quarter-
century gross U.S. expenditures on plant and equipment have increased
as a share of the nation's gross national product. More importantly,
however, while gross capital formation has represented a progressively
larger share of total output, the corresponding net capital formation
underwent a sharp reversal within this period. As the second column of
the table shows, net U.S. investment in plant and equipment (that is, net
of the true economic depreciation) rose rapidly as a share of total output
between the late 1950s and the late 1960s, but then fell back almost as
rapidly by the late 1970s.
Still, it is gross capital outlays that the businesses and individuals
investing in plant and equipment need to finance. Corporations engaged
in nonfinancial lines of business have consistently accounted for nearly
three-fourths of all U.S. investment in plant and equipment since World
War II. As the next two columns of Table 6.4 show, over the last
quarter-century the U.S. nonfinancial corporate business sector has in-
creasingly relied on external as opposed to internal funds (including
depreciation allowances) in financing its capital outlays.
1
0 Moreover, as
the table's final columns show, corporations have consistently raised
almost all of these external funds by issuing debt, and in doing so they
have increasingly relied on short-term instruments (for further details see
Friedman, forthcoming).
How has the economy absorbed this enormous expansion in the corpo-
rate sector's reliance on debt? As the discussion in Section 6.1 of the U.S.
economy's stable overall debt-to-income ratio notes, the chief counter-
part of the increasing corporate (and household) indebtedness relative to
income over much of this period has been the federal government's
declining indebtedness relative to income.
Recognition of this stable overall debt-to-income relationship raises
two important questions about the financing of an increased rate of U.S.
capital formation in the 1980s. First, if business corporations undertake
sharply increased capital outlays, will they be able to continue their
10. The appearance of a reversal in the latest half-decade is largely due to the aftermath
of the unusually severe 1973-75 recession as well as the 1980 recession.109 Debt and Economic Activity
reliance on debt financing if the federal government's indebtedness rela-
tive to gross national product declines only slowly (or not at all) as in the
1970s, in contrast to the rapid decline in the 1950s and '60s? The historical
experience represented by the data shown in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1
suggests otherwise. If the stability of the economy's aggregate nonfinan-
cial debt-to-income ratio is indeed a regularity likely to persist, then the
corporate sector will be able to undertake more investment in plant and
equipment only if the government's relative indebtedness falls, or if
corporations turn increasingly to equity finance through retention of
internally generated funds or issues of new shares.
Second, even if declining federal government indebtedness relative to
income does enable the corporate sector to finance increased capital
outlays by further increasing its own indebtedness relative to income,
what effect will this renewed change in the U.S. economy's government/
private debt mix have on the economy's overall level of financial risk? In
an economy with highly developed financial markets, potential hazards to
the stability of the economy as a whole arise not just from the disruptions
that from time to time may disturb the economy's nonfinancial activity
directly but also from fragility of the financial superstructure built around
it. Although a detailed consideration of the level of aggregate financial
risk associated with any given further change in the government/private
debt mix lies beyond the scope of this chapter, it is clear that, without a
base of presumably default-free government debt (or private debt ren-
dered default free through effective monetization), each market partici-
pant's financial assets consist simply of other market participants'
liabilities.
1
1 Even if it is not necessary for the corporate sector to turn to
equity finance because of an inability to increase its relative indebtedness,
therefore, greater reliance on equity finance may nevertheless have an
important role to play in the context of a sharply increased U.S. capital
formation rate.
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